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BOOK REVIEW
SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF
THE OLD REPUBLIC. By R. Kent Newmyer.* Chapel Hill &
London. The University of North Carolina Press, 1985. Pp. xvii, 490.
Reviewed by Richard S. Kay**
Joseph Story's image among lawyers in the twentieth century has
been largely that of a cranky reactionary, attached to a conservative
politics and an anachronistic jurisprudence. Modern law students asso-
ciate him with a handful of landmark cases, notably Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee,1 in which he is perceived as Marshall's minion, and
Swift v. Tyson,' in which he enunciated a theory of law that, in light of
later criticisms, might most charitably be characterized as laughable.
Indeed, in a review of an earlier biography, the late Professor Gilmore
noted that the only live issue about Story for his own generation of law
students "was whether he was more stupid than he was wicked, or al-
ternatively, more wicked than he was stupid."3
As Kent Newmyer's superb new biography makes clear, however,
Story deserves at least a more serious, if not a more favorable, consid-
eration from modern legal scholars. The mere tangible products of his
* Professor of History, University of Connecticut.
** Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. A.B., Brandeis University;
M.A., Yale University; J.D., Harvard University.
1. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
2. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
3. Gilmore, Book Review, 39 U. CHI. L. Rav. 244, 244 (1971) (reviewing G. DuNNE. Jusrnes
JOSEPH STORY AND THE RISE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1970)). One source of Story's reputation
seems to be the frequently cited evaluation of the Justice made by John Chipman Gray in his
attack on the holding in Swift v. Tyson:
Among the causes which led to the decision in Swift v. Tyson, the chief seems to have
been the character and position of Judge Story. He was then by far the oldest judge in
commission on the bench; he was a man of great learning, and of reputation for learning
greater even than the learning itself; he was occupied at the time in writing a book on
bills of exchange, which would, of itself, lead him to dogmatize on the subject; he had
had great success in extending the jurisdiction of the Admiralty;, and he was possessed by
a restless vanity. All of these things conspired to produce the result.
J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 253 (2d ed. 1921). Although there was far
more to Story-and to Swift v. Tyson-than this, Gray's characterization of Story is generally
consistent with the personal portrait presented in Newmycer's biography.
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life were no less than stupendous. Story served for thirty-four years on
the Supreme Court and wrote many important decisions both for the
full court and as circuit judge.4 More critical, perhaps, were his contri-
butions to the growth and systemization of American law in what
Pound called its "formative era."5 He wrote nine substantial treatises
covering almost every important field of law and, in some cases such as
equity and conflicts, practically creating them.8 At the same time, he
was the principal figure establishing the Harvard Law School, and the
very idea of a "national" law school was largely his invention.7 When
all of Story's activities-those of judge, scholar and teacher-are taken
together, it appears that no other single person in his time was as sig-
nificant in shaping the American legal system.
Newmyer's biography does justice to the scope, depth, and com-
plexity of these achievements. Its rich and perceptive description of the
events and accomplishments of Story's life is backed up by unprece-
dented research, including what appears to be an exhaustive examina-
tion of the letters and papers of Story and many of his contemporaries
as well as the relevant published material of the period. It is certainly
the most thorough and insightful volume on Story to date, and it is
doubtful whether it can be significantly improved.
The biography describes Story as a person, as a public figure, and
4. Story was appointed in 1811 at the age of 32 (the youngest man ever appointed to the
Supreme Court) and he served on the Court until he died in 1845. See R.K. NEWMYER, SUPREME
COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE OLD REPUBLIC 64, 381 (1985) [hereinafter
cited as NEWMYER]. Among Story's other more important decisions were his opinion for the Court
in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842) (interpreting the Fugitive Slave Act of
1793); his concurring opinion in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819)
(construing the contracts clause of the U.S. Constitution); and his dissent in Charles River Bridge
v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837) (also construing the contracts clause). His opin-
ions for the Court were fewer than might be expected because Chief Justice Marshall wrote al-
most half of the opinions of the Court during his long tenure. See Johnson, John Marshall in 1
THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969, at 285, 300-01 (Friedman &
Israel eds. 1969). Among Story's better known opinions on circuit were Delovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas.
418 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3776), in which he promulgated a very broad definition of federal
admiralty jurisdiction; and United States v. LaJeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832 (C.C.D. Mass.
1822) (No. 15,551), which limited the rights of vessels engaging in the slave trade. One frequently
discussed Story opinion that Newmyer does not treat extensively is Vidal v. Girard's Executor, 43
U.S. (2 How.) 127 (1844), in which the Court held enforceable that section of the will of Stephen
Girard establishing a school administered by municipal authorities in which, by the terms of the
will, no minister could enter. That opinion has been called "the cornerstone of the American law
of charitable trusts." Clark, Charitable Trusts, The Fourteenth Amendment and The Will of
Stephen Girard, 66 YALE LJ. 979, 986 (1957).
5. See R. POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 3 (1938).
6. See NEWMYER. supra note 4, at 281, 289-304.
7. See id. at 238-43, 264.
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as a thinker with detail, precision, and wit. It sets him in the political,
social, and intellectual context of the first half of the nineteenth en-
tury, allowing us to see how the concerns of the post-Revolutionary
War generation influenced and shaped his actions and ideas. The ten
chapters are organized not so much by chronology as by the projects
and issues that engaged Story's career. Throughout the biography,
Newmyer's compelling narrative style makes vivid the people and
places of Story's life. Most usefully, Newmyer presents the consistent
ideas-or, perhaps more accurately, notions-that dominated Story's
conception of law and constitutional order.
Newmyer identifies two overarching themes of Story's view of law
republicanism and legal science. As Newmyer correctly points out,
these concepts were not capable of precise definition and were probably
only dimly conceived of even by those, like Story, who used them fre-
quently.8 What sense we can make of them, however, leads to an initial
impression that they should not coexist as easily as they seem to have
done in the person of Justice Story and in his legal culture.
In embracing the idea of legal science, Story believed that the
study and practice of law was a rational endeavor and that "the law"
was an object that would respond to such an endeavor. As such, the law
could not be the mere creature of human will, but had to have some
reason and structure of its own. The spirit of this idea is summed up in
Story's much abused dictum in Swift that the common law decisions of
the judges "are, at most, only evidence of what the laws are; and are
not themselves laws." He was even more explicit in his inaugural lec-
ture as Dane Professor in 1829:
Much, indeed, of this unwritten law may now be found in
books, in elementary treatises and in judicial decisions. But it
does not derive its force from these circumstances. On the con-
trary, even judicial decisions are deemed but the formal pro-
mulgation of rules antecedently existing, and obtain all their
value from their supposed conformity to those rules.10
Such a view of law as a preexisting entity, to be dealt with rather than
manufactured, could lead, in an extreme form, to a concomitant belief
in the incapacity of human beings to effect significant change in the
8. See id. at xiv-xvi.
9. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18.
10. J. STORY, Value and Importance of Legal Studies in THE MISCEu.AEOUS WnINGs or
JOSEPH STORY 503, 506 (DeCapo Press ed. 1972) (W. Story ed. 1852).
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law. Indeed, there are places in Story's writing in which just this atti-
tude appears. I For the most part, however, Story acknowledged and
applauded flexibility in the application and development of the common
law."2
In light of this evidence, Newmyer quite rightly questions whether
we should take seriously the idea that Story really believed judges dis-
covered rather than made law.' But even if Story acknowledged law-
making capacity in judges, his concept of legal science entailed aspects
of law that should be beyond human control. Legal science dictated, if
not the substance of law, then at least the process by which law was
properly created. For Story, it therefore imposed a priori constraints on
what judges could do by specifying a correct technique for judicial law
making. Scientific rules could assure the orderly unfolding of the genius
of the law that was already present, if inchoate, in the material with
which a judge had to work.' 4 This method of legal science therefore
gave an assurance that judicial power would not be arbitrary power. In
that sense, Story agreed with Lord Coke that "no man ought to take it
on himself to be wiser than the laws."' 5
The second important strain in Story's jurisprudence was republi-
canism. Here Newmyer points out the significance of Story's youth and
11. See, e.g., J. STORY, Codification of the Common Law in MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS,
supra note 10, at 698, 719:
When once a doctrine is fully recognized as a part of the common law, it forever remains
part of the system, until it is altered by the legislature. A doctrine of the common law
settled three hundred years ago is just as conclusive now in a case, which falls within it,
as it was then. No court of justice can disregard it, or dispense with it; and nothing short
of legislative power can abrogate it. With us the notion that courts of justice ought to be
at liberty from time to time to change established doctrines, to suit their own views of
convenience or policy, would be treated as a most alarming dogma, subversive of some of
the best rights of a free people, and especially of the right to have justice administered
upon certain fixed and known principles. Our ancestors adopted in its fullest meaning the
maxim, that it is a wretched servitude, where the law is vague and uncertain. Hence it is,
that precedents in our courts of justice are of very high authority, and, with rare excep-
tion, conclusive as to the principles, which they decide and establish; and subsequent
judges are not at liberty to depart from them, when they have once become a rule of
rights or of property.
12. See NEWMYER, supra note 4, at 119, 243; STORY, supra note 10, at 507-08 ("[The law]
must forever be in a state of progress, or change, to adapt itself to the exigencies and changes of
society. ... )
13. NEWMYER, supra note 4, at 113.
14. Thus the imprecise process of constitutional construction was to be rationalized by appli-
cations of 19 scientific rules of interpretation. Id. at 191-92. When hemmed in by scientific rules,
judicial power was not arbitrary power. See id. at 105.
15. Quoted in J. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW 35 (1967).
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education in the period immediately following the Revolution.'0 In that
era of literal nation-building, every young man of talent faced a wor~d
of unbounded possibilities. "Those touched by this revolutionary vi-
sion," Newmyer explains, "were compelled to think and act boldly,
comprehensively, idealistically, and passionately-to see the nation in
providential terms and themselves as instruments of civic
regeneration.1
1 7
In concrete terms, this outlook often translated into matters of ec-
onomics. The greatness of the republic was to be realized in ever-ex-
panding commerce and capital formation. Insofar as law contributed to
this vision, Story felt that it would have to be free and flexible and
responsive to the constantly changing features of the economy and
society:
In free governments, and in those where the popular interests
have obtained some representation or power, however limited,
...[we can] trace a regular progress from age to age in their
laws, a gradual adaptation of them to the increasing wants
and employments of society, and a substantial improvement,
corresponding with their advancement in the refinements and
elegancies of life.18
Change for the better was within the power of the good citizen, and
was, in fact, his pressing duty. The success of the republic thus de-
pended on the exercise of human will."
Newmyer's description of legal science and republicanism there-
fore suggests a certain tension between the two notions. The former, in
positing a knowable legal technique, assumed elements of constancy.
The latter, in assuming law to be shaped by ever changing economic
and social needs, was premised on the law's fluid and dynamic charac-
ter. Such a conflict is not entirely surprising given the age in which
Story lived and worked. The early nineteenth century has been seen as
a cusp in the development of the idea of American Law. In contrast to
the eighteenth century, which has been viewed by modern legal histori-
ans as a period in which the common law "was conceived of as a body
of essentially fixed doctrine," 20 the period in question saw the "emer-
16. See NEWMYER. supra note 4, at xv-xvi, 30-36.
17. Id. at xvi. See also id. at 386-87.
18. J. STORY, The Progress of Jurisprudence in MISCE .LANEOUS WsTINGS. supra note 10, at
198, 199. Story's model in this regard was Lord Mansfield. See Id. at 205-11.
19. See NEWNYER, supra note 4, at 36.
20. M. HORwrrz, THE TRANSFOR, ATION OF AMERICAN LAw. 1780-1860, at 1 (1977).
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gence of an instrumental concept of law," in which the law was a "cre-
ative instrument for directing men's energies toward social change."21
These tendencies of stasis and movement are evident in the two differ-
ent aspects of Story's jurisprudence that Newmyer identifies. The ques-
tion remains, however, of whether and how Justice Story reconciled the
concepts of republicanism and legal science in his own mind and in his
work. If his thinking was characterized by any kind of schizophrenia,
he seemed entirely unaware of it. The demands of republicanism and
legal science appeared to him to be not merely compatible but
complementary.
22
There are several possible explanations. One is that Story's com-
mitment to a stabilizing and rationalizing legal science was a sham.
According to this view, Story's main ambition was not to limit or chan-
nel legal change in any predetermined way but merely to put the con-
trol of such change in more reliable hands, namely, those of the judges.
Story camouflaged this essentially political preference with the fine and
neutral sounding rhetoric of legal science.23
It is difficult, at this date, to judge Story's sincerity or the degree
to which his views might have been the product of self-deception. Cer-
tainly the Story who emerges from this biography preferred the policy
making of the judges to that of the political branches, and devoted
much of his life to promoting the power of the courts. Newmyer notes
that for Story "lawyers, judges, the courts and the common law were a
corrective to, even an alternative to, the bumbling work of politicians
and legislatures." 24 But the constancy and frequency with which Story
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., NEWMYER, supra note 4, at 137-38. The elusive character of these concepts and
the ambiguity of the labels attached to them is underscored by the fact that another commentator
has identified roughly the same tendencies in Story but accorded them exactly the opposite names.
Professor Powell sees Story's emphasis on legal science as a preference for flexible pragmatic law,
and he views Story's commitment to republicanism as having the potential to bind the judge to a
static, text-bound interpretation of the Constitution. See Powell, Joseph Story's Commentaries on
the Constitution: A Belated Review, 94 YALE LJ. 1285, 1307 (1985).
23. See M. HoRwirz, supra note 20, at 255-57.
24. NEWMYER. supra note 4, at 63. See also id. at 143, where Newmyer explains that:
Story assigned courts in general and the Supreme Court of the United States above all
others a central role in economic rule making. Judges working in the common-law mode,
more than legislators and politicians (and the two increasingly merged in Story's percep-
tion), were uniquely qualified to lead the old republic into the new economic age. This
was a heavy burden of statesmanship, given the magnitude of social and economic change
and the inchoate structure of American law. Undaunted, Story willingly put judges in the
front line of policy making with the promise that judge-made law would be relevant and,
at the same time, true to the basic morality of property rights on which it rested.
[Vol. 18:207
BOOK REVIEW
relied on the idea of an independent science of law argue against the
suggestion that it was a cynical political device. Story undoubtedly pre-
ferred the rule of judges, but it is more reasonable to think that this
preference resulted from his belief in the possibility of legal science
than to think that it caused that belief. 5
There is another, more plausible explanation for the prominence of
both legal science and republicanism in Story's thought. The law that
emerged from the constraints of legal science was, to Story, better law
for the tasks required to perfect the republic. The order and stability of
scientific law would promote the moral and material improvement of
society, and, in particular, would enhance the economic activity that
preoccupied republican society. Story sought some fixed assurance as to
the roles of law and the state in stimulating or impeding development.
Professor Hurst recognized this need for order in his well-known con-
clusion that "[o]nly within some minimum framework of reasonably
predictable consequences were men likely to cultivate boldness and en-
ergy in action." Law provided that framework for the release of en-
ergy.28 Newmyer cites an 1824 letter from Daniel Webster to Story
that captures this attitude: "It is a great object to settle the concerns of
the community, so that one may know what to depend on."27 As Story
pointed out over and over again, legal science was applied science; it
was practical science.28 In early nineteenth century America, practical-
ity implied accommodation and facilitation of change. The law could
provide the fixed reference points that guaranteed that change would
be useful. Story aimed, in Newmyer's words, for a "law-fashioned ra-
tional economic environment. 29 Orderly law was thus compatible with
the aspirations and methods of the shapers of the republic, the practical
men "who knew what they wanted the law to do." 3°
25. "Law and politics for him were different ways of doing things: One was based on principle
and science and the other on compromise and short-term silf-interest." NEWIYER, Supra note 4.
at 71-72.
26. J. HursT, LAw AND THE CONDIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
UNITED STATES 22 (1956).
27. NEWMYER, supra note 4, at 120. On the need for stable rules as a precondition to eco-
nomic activity, see also M. HoRwrrz, supra note 20, at 26; Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal
Practice in the Age of American Enterprise 1870-1920 in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOL-
OGLES IN AMERICA 70, 92 (G. Geison ed. 1983). On the more general connection of legal science,
legal certainty, and natural law, see R. GABUEL, THE COURSE OF AMERICAN DEOCcRATIc
THOUGHT 14-19 (1940).
28. See, e.g., NEWMYER, supra note 4, at xiv, 243, 285.
29. NEWMYER, supra note 4, at 120.
30. Id. at 45. For Story, the order of legal science complemented economic and social change
1985]
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This understanding of scientific law in the service of growth is evi-
dent in Story's various endeavors. It was an important reason for both
his academic writing and his work at the Harvard Law School. In each
case, Story saw his efforts as tending toward a single rational scheme of
American law against which fruitful individual activity would be eas-
ier.31 Some examples from his judicial work further illustrate the point.
Story professed to believe in a strict enforcement of contracts.
With some exceptions,82 he was unreceptive to refined and technical
legal arguments by which individuals, corporations, or governments
could avoid contractual liability.33 Story felt that a strict rule, requiring
individuals and enterprises to keep their promises, was good for busi-
ness.3 4 Perhaps his clearest statement to that effect was in his dissent-
ing opinion in the Charles River Bridge case.35 There Chief Justice
Taney's majority opinion, insisting on a strict construction of corporate
charters against the grantee-and a correspondingly liberal construc-
tion with respect to the rights of the state-was characterized by Pro-
fessor Hurst as "[t]he classic statement of policy in favor of freedom
for creative change."3 6 But Story's opinion advocating a more liberal
interpretation of the original grant, so as more comprehensively to bind
the state to its contract, is also frankly utilitarian and sympathetic to
development:
For my own part, I can conceive of no surer plan to arrest all
public improvements, founded on private capital and enter-
prise, than to make the outlay of that capital uncertain, and
questionable both as to security, and as to productiveness. No
man will hazard his capital in any enterprise in which, if there
be a loss, it must be borne exclusively by himself; and if there
be a success, he has not the slightest security of enjoying the
rewards of that success for a single moment. If the govern-
in another way as well. Although change, in general, was both welcome and inevitable, certain
types of change were more desirable. Because the progress of the republic was tied up with moral
growth, legal science was a way to channel and direct human activity to increase not just material
well-being, but virtue as well. See, e.g., Newmyer's discussion of Story's moral objections to the
holding in the Charles River Bridge case, id. at 231-35.
31. See, e.g., id. at 264, 285.
32. Story made an exception for employment contracts of seamen, which he viewed as inher-
ently harsh and one-sided. See id. at 151-53.
33. Id. at 153-54.
34. Id. at 154.
35. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 583 (1837).
36. J. Husr, supra note 26, at 27.
[Vol. 18:207214
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ment means to invite its citizens to enlarge the public comforts
and conveniences, to establish bridges, or turnpikes, or canals,
or railroads, there must be some pledge, that the property will
be safe; that the enjoyment will be co-extensive with the grant,
and that success will not be the signal of a general combina-
tion to overthrow its rights, and take away its profits. The very
agitation of a question of this sort, is sufficient to alarm every
stockholder in every public enterprise of this sort, throughout
the whole country.
Much the same interpretation may be applied to what was proba-
bly the greatest theme of Story's judicial career, the attempt to extend
the jurisdiction of the federal courts. His aim in this endeavor was
plainly to promote the unification of American law and to assure a fo-
rum in which clear, consistent and scientific law could be expected. The
piecemeal, often conflicting results that were bound to follow when
matters were committed to the numerous independent state systems
were the antithesis of the single orderly regime that was his ideal.
Here, too, Story sought order not for its own sake but as an entirely
practical ambition.
This goal of practical order was apparent in Story's unsuccessful
effort to institute a federal common law of crimes against the United
States-although here his target was not so much the multiplicity of
rules emerging from state courts, as the failure of Congress to supply a
criminal code sufficient to protect important interests of the federal
government.3 It was also evident in his more successful effort to estab-
lish a broad definition of the federal courts' admiralty jurisdiction. In
DeLovio v. Boit, 9 his most important circuit opinion on the point,
Story canvassed, contended with, and distinguished the English author-
ities. He then rested, at least in part, on the conviction that "[t]he ad-
vantages resulting to the commerce and navigation of the United
States, from a uniformity of rules and decisions in all maritime ques-
tions, authorize us to believe that national policy, as well as juridical
logic" required the result.' °
Story's best known effort in federalizing the law, of course, is his
37. 36 U.S. (I I Pet.) at 608. See NEWMYER, supra note 4, at 227.
38. See NEWMYER, supra note 4, at 103.
39. 7 F. Cas. 418 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3776). It was said that if Story encountered a
cob in a bucket of water he would assert over it the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States.
See NEWMYER. supra note 4, at 207.
40. 7 F. Cas. at 443. See NEWMYER, supra note 4, at 123-25.
1985]
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opinion in Swift v. Tyson.41 There the Court held that a "general"
common law, and not state law, provided the rules of decision in com-
mercial cases coming under the federal courts' diversity jurisdiction.
Swift is the opinion most often cited to demonstrate the formalist and
unrealistic basis of Story's jurisprudence, his reliance on a "brooding
omnipresence in the sky."' 42 But it is clear that the unified and formal
vision of the common law that Story enunciated in Swift was, to his
mind, an important practical tool in creating a legal system appropriate
to the profitable exercise of human will. Particularly with respect to
questions of commercial law (and Swift itself really went no further)
the desirability of uniform national rules to promote interstate eco-
nomic activity was, and is, obviously, a judgment confirmed by the en-
actment of uniform state laws in this century.43
The specific holding of Swift demonstrates Story's commitment to
order as an instrument of development. The Court found that discharge
of an antecedent debt constituted sufficient giving of value to make the
taker of a negotiable instrument a holder in due course, notwithstand-
ing a colorable argument that the law of New York, where the transac-
tion took place, was contrary.44 Story undoubtedly felt that a multiplic-
ity of rules for determining holder in due course status would chill the
interstate movement of capital. Story's ideal here (and in the constitu-
tional commerce clause cases to which he subscribed45 ) was a single
national market with a single set of rules.46
Even Story's judicial disposition toward the terrible questions of
41. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) I (1842).
42. NEWMYER. supra note 4, at 334 (quoting letter from O.W. Holmes to Sir Frederick Pol-
lock, Feb. 17, 1928, in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETrERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE
HOLMES AND SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, 1874-1932, at 214-15 (M. Howe ed. 2d ed. 1961)).
43. See NEWMYER, supra note 4, at 290, 296, 333-34; G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN
LAW 32-34, 83-86 (1977).
44. Professor Gilmore argued that Story's position that antecedent debt was sufficient value
was an entirely uncontroversial point and was law in New York, as well as everywhere else. Con-
sequently, the Court really had no reason to consider the applicability of a general federal com-
mon law and must be suspected of seizing the case as an opportunity to announce the federaliza-
tion of commercial law. G. GILMORE, supra note 43, at 32-34. Professor Horwitz, however,
suggests that the concept of negotiability presented a live and controversial issue at the time (al-
though all of the anti-negotiability law he cites is statutory) and that the substantive question was
quite important. M. HORWITZ, supra note 20, at 223-24. Newmyer makes a convincing argument
that the choice of law holding was not regarded as particularly novel and was received with wide-
spread indifference. NEWMYER, supra note 4, at 336.
45. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). Newmyer notes suggestions
that Story may have helped Marshall write Gibbons. NEWMYER, supra note 4, at 127.
46. Thus he included in Swift a quotation from Cicero that there could not be one law in
Athens and another in Rome. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 19.
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slavery demonstrates a commitment to the usefulness, even the moral-
ity, of an abstract and settled law.47 There is little question about
Story's personal abhorrence of slavery, and, when the opportunity
arose, he expressed it forcefully in his opinions.48 But Story is probably
more frequently identified with his punctilious fidelity to the Fugitive
Slave Law in Prigg v. Pennsylvania.49 Newmyer discusses Story's pri-
vate defense of Prigg as a "triumph of freedom," in that it ousted the
states of any authority or role in the rendition of fugitive slaves, but
reasonably concludes that this explanation was unconvincing. 0 Story's
priorities were made plain in his strong endorsement of the fugitive
slave provision of the Constitution in his Commentaries on the Consti-
tution.5 1 At least one public value was more precious than personal lib-
erty, and that was social order. 2 Because nothing else threatened that
order like the issue of slavery, it could only be preserved by a strict
compliance with the legal arrangements that could suppress or avoid
the dangerous controversy.53 In Prigg, as elsewhere, Story put his faith
in rules to preserve the environment in which change for the bet-
ter-even, he vainly hoped, concerning slavery--could occur.5
The two great themes of Story's jurisprudence, legal science and
republicanism, thus fit together in the idea of legal order in the service
of social and economic change. This combination is in no way confined
to the peculiar circumstances of Story's time. That law is, in its largest
47. Professor Gilmore regarded Story's slavery opinions as marked by an "entirely foreign"
formalism. G. GILMORE, supra note 43, at 38. For the reasons indicated in the text, I do not
regard formalism as foreign to Story's jurisprudence. For a thoughtful consideration of Story's
accommodation of his positions on slavery and the judicial role, see R. COVER, JUSTCE AccUSED
131-48, 238-43 (1975).
48. See United States v. LaJeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551).
discussed in NEWMYER, supra note 4, at 347-50; United States v. Amistad, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 518
(1841), discussed in NEWMYER. supra note 4, at 368-70.
49. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
50. See NEWMYER, supra note 4, at 372-77.
51. Id. at 352, 377.
52. Speaking to the fugitive slave question in 1843, Story said:
If one part of the country may disregard one part of the Constitution, another section
may refuse to obey that part which seems to bear hard upon its interests, and thus the
Union will become a 'mere rope of sand'; and the Constitution, worse than a dead letter,
an apple of discord in our midst, a fruitful source of reproach, bitterness, and hatred, and
in the end discord and civil war...
NEWMYER, supra note 4, at 378. See also id. at 352-53.
53. He therefore hated the abolitionists. See id. at 357.
54. Story was a gradualist. He believed slavery would fade away in a process that would be




sense, a human instrument, cannot seriously be questioned. It achieves
its aims, however, not by the prescription of results for individual in-
stances, but by the prior establishment of general rules. The law sacri-
fices precision in its substantive accomplishments to the supposed bene-
fits of predictability and stability. Our law is, then, at any time, a
compromise between two kinds of social values, those of substance and
those of form.55
Story's amalgamation of these two notions, however, seemed to in-
volve something more. He envisioned a common law that would,
through the application of legal science, continue to become both
clearer and simpler and, at the same time, better suited to the real
needs of society.5 Order and movement were thus symbiotically con-
nected. To Story, order was always in movement and that movement
was always toward more perfect order:
57
It is [the common law's] true glory, that it is flexible, and
constantly expanding with the exigencies of society; that it
daily presents new motives for new and loftier efforts; that it
holds out forever an unapproached degree of excellence; that it
moves onward on the path toward perfection, but never arrives
at the ultimate point.58
A perceptive review of Story's life and writing, such as that pro-
vided by Newmyer, makes clear that Story believed that there was a
proper direction in human history, and that it could be discerned and
followed. 59 In the law, this confidence is best expressed in the maxim of
55. General rules may also have the virtue of minimizing mistakes in individual applications
of a general policy. On the relative benefits of policy-making by general rule and individual in-
stance, see R. COvER, supra note 47, at 146-47; Alexander, Pursuing the Good-Indirectly, 95
ETHics 315 (1985); Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL REV. 3 (1955).
56. Story foresaw an ever-increasing area of behavior that would be governed by rules:
May I add, in the language of the eminent living jurist (Sir James Mackintosh) whom I
have already cited, that "there is not, in my opinion, in the whole compass of human
affairs, so noble a spectacle as that which is displayed in the progress of jurisprudence;
where we may contemplate the cautious and unwearied exertions of a succession of wise
men through a long course of ages, withdrawing every case, as it arises, from the danger-
ous power of discretion, and subjecting it to inflexible rules; extending the dominion of
justice and reason; and gradually contracting, within the narrowest possible limits, the
domain of brutal force and arbitrary will.
J. STORY, supra note 18, at 239 [citations omitted].
57. J. STORY. supra note 10, at 526.
58. Id.
59. By the end of his life, however, Story had doubts that this would occur. See NEWMYER,
supra note 4, at 308-09.
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Lord Mansfield (whom Story so much admired) that the common law
"works itself pure." 60 More generally, this "path toward perfection"
embraces the idea of progress, an idea that suffuses much of Story's
writing. It is in that idea that legal science and republicanism merge,
and it may be that idea, more than anything else, that separates Story's
world from ours. 61
60. Mansfield used the phrase in his argument as Solicitor-General in Omychund v. Barker, I
Atk. 22, 33, 26 Eng. Rep. 15, 23 (1744). The full sentence from which it is drawn reads: "A
statute very seldom can take in all cases, therefore the common law, that works itself pure by
rules drawn from the fountain of justice, is for this reason superior to an act of parliament."
61. See R. GABRIEL, supra note 27, at 19-20.
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